Abstract. We examine recursive monotonic functions on the Lindenbaum algebra of EA. We prove that no such function sends every consistent ϕ to a sentence with deductive strength strictly between ϕ and pϕ^Conpϕqq. We generalize this result to iterates of consistency into the effective transfinite. We then prove that for any recursive monotonic function f , if there is an iterate of Con that bounds f everywhere, then f must be somewhere equal to an iterate of Con.
Introduction
It is a well-known empirical phenomenon that natural axiomatic theories are wellordered by their consistency strength. However, without a precise mathematical definition of "natural," it is difficult to explain this observation in a strictly mathematical way. One expression of this phenomenon comes from ordinal analysis, a research program whereby recursive ordinals are assigned to theories as a measurement of their consistency strength. One method for calculating the proof-theoretic ordinal of a theory T involves demonstrating that T can be approximated over a weak base theory by a class of formulas that are well understood. In particular, the Π 0 1 fragments of natural theories are often proof-theoretically equivalent to iterated consistency statements over a weak base theory, making these theories amenable to ordinal analysis. For discussion, see, e.g., Beklemishev [4, 5] and Joosten [10] .
Why are the Π 0 1 fragments of natural theories proof-theoretically equivalent to iterated consistency statements? Our approach to this question is inspired by Martin's approach to another famous question from mathematical logic: why are natural Turing degrees well-ordered by Turing reducibility? Martin conjectured that (i) the non-constant degree invariant functions meeting a certain simplicity condition (f P LpRq) 1 are pre-well-ordered by the relation "f paq ď T gpaq on a cone in the Turing degrees" and (ii) the successor for this well-ordering is induced by the Turing jump. Martin's conjecture is meant to capture the idea that the Turing jump and its iterates into the transfinite are the only natural non-trivial degree invariant functions.
In this paper we investigate analogous hypotheses concerning jumps on consistent axiomatic theories, namely, consistency statements. We fix elementary arithmetic EA as our base theory. EA is a subsystem of PA that is often used as a base theory in ordinal analysis and in which standard approaches to arithmetization of syntax can be carried out without substantial changes; see [6] for details. We write rϕs to denote the equivalence class of ϕ modulo EA-provable equivalence. We write ϕ $ ψ Thanks to Matthew Harrison-Trainor for simplifying the proof of Lemma 7.1. We extend special thanks to V. Yu. Shavrukov and Albert Visser for their extensive and very helpful comments and suggestions. 1 Martin's Conjecture is stated under the hypothesis ZF`AD`DC, which is satisfied by LpRq assuming that there are ω many Woodin cardinals with a measurable above them all.
if EA $ ϕ Ñ ψ and say that ϕ implies ψ. If ϕ $ ψ but ψ & ϕ we say that ϕ strictly implies ψ. The Lindenbaum algebra of EA is the set of equivalence classes of sentences ordered by $. We focus on recursive functions f that are monotonic, i.e., if ϕ $ ψ, then f pϕq $ f pψq.
We note that (i) a function f is monotonic just in case f preserves implication over EA and (ii) all monotonic functions induce functions on the Lindenbaum algebra of EA. We adopt the convention that all functions named "f " in this paper are recursive.
Our goal is to demonstrate that ϕ Þ Ñ pϕ^Conpϕqq and its iterates into the transfinite are canonical among monotonic functions. Our first theorem to this end is the following.
Theorem 1.1. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all consistent ϕ, (i) ϕ^Conpϕq implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq strictly implies ϕ.
Then for every true ϕ, there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and rf pψqs " rψ^Conpψqs.
Corollary 1.2. There is no monotonic function f such that for all consistent ϕ, (i) ϕ^Conpϕq strictly implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq strictly implies ϕ.
We note that this result depends essentially on the condition of monotonicity. Shavrukov and Visser [13] studied recursive functions f that are extensional over the Lindenbaum algebra of PA, i.e., if PA $ pϕ Ø ψq, then PA $ pf pϕq Ø f pψqq, and proved the following theorem. In particular, Shavrukov and Visser proved that for any consistent ϕ, the sentence
as deductive strength strictly between ϕ and ϕ^Conpϕq, and that the map ϕ Þ Ñ ϕ ‹ is extensional. By a theorem of Kripke and Pour-El [11] , the Lindenbaum algebras of PA and EA are effectively isomorphic, whence Theorem 1.3 also applies to EA. Thus, Corollary 1.2 cannot be strengthened by weakening the hypothesis of monotonicity to the hypothesis of extensionality. We also note that Friedman, Rathjen, and Weiermann [8] introduced a notion of slow consistency with which they produced a Π 0 1 sentence SlowConpPAq with deductive strength strictly between PA and PA`ConpPAq. In general, the statement SlowConpϕq has the form @xpF ǫ0 pxq ÓÑ ConpIΣ x`ϕwhere F ǫ0 is a standard representation of a recursive function that is not provably total in PA. This is not in conflict with Corollary 1.2, however, since ϕ^Conpϕq and ϕ^SlowConpϕq are provably equivalent for all ϕ such that ϕ $ @xF ǫ0 pxq Ó.
On the other hand, changing the definition of the SlowConpϕq so that the function in the antecedent varies with the input ϕ results in a map that is not monotonic. Theorem 1.1 generalizes to the iterates of Con into the effective transfinite. For an elementary presentation α of a recursive well-ordering (see Definition 3.1) and a sentence ϕ, we define sentences Con β pϕq for every β ă α.
For a precise definition using Gödel's fixed point lemma, see Definition 3.2. Note that for every ϕ, rCon 1 pϕqs " rConpϕqs.
Remark 1.4. We warn the reader that there is some discrepancy between our notation and the notation used by other authors. Our iteration scheme Con α`1 pϕq " Conpϕ^Con α pϕqq is sometimes denoted ConppEA`ϕq α q, e.g., [2] . Moreoever, the notation Con α`1 pϕq is sometimes used to denote ConpCon α pϕqq, e.g., [3] .
With each predicate Con α we associate a function ϕ Þ Ñ pϕ^Con α pϕqq. Thus, if the range of a monotonic function f is sufficiently constrained, then for some ϕ and some α, rf pϕqs " rϕ^Con α pϕqs ‰ rKs.
This property still holds even when these constraints on the range of f are relaxed considerably. More precisely, if a monotonic function is everywhere bounded by a finite iterate of Con, then it must be somewhere equivalent to an iterate of Con. Theorem 1.7. Let f be a monotonic function such that for every ϕ, (i) ϕ^Con n pϕq implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq implies ϕ. Then for some ϕ and some k ď n, rf pϕqs " rϕ^Con k pϕqs ‰ rKs.
To generalize this result into the effective transfinite, we focus on a particular class of monotonic functions that we call Π 0 1 .
Our main theorem is the following: if a monotonic function is everywhere bounded by a transfinite iterate of Con, then it must be somewhere equivalent to an iterate of Con. This to say that the iterates of the consistency operator are inevitable; no monotonic function that is everywhere bounded by some iterate of Con can avoid all of the iterates of Con. The main theorem bears a striking similarity to the following theorem of Slaman and Steel [14] . There are two notable disanalogies between Theorem 1.9 and Theorem 1.10. First, Theorem 1.9 guarantees only that sufficiently constrained functions are somewhere equivalent to an iterate of Con, whereas Theorem 1.10 guarantees cofinal equivalence with an iterate of the Turing jump. Second, by assuming AD, Slaman and Steel inferred that this behavior happens not only cofinally but also on a cone in the Turing degrees. There is no obvious analogue of AD from which one can infer that if cofinally many Lindenbaum degrees have a property then every element in some non-trivial ideal of Lindenbaum degrees has that property.
We then turn our attention to a generalization of consistency, namely, 1-consistency. Recall that a theory T is 1-consistent if T is consistent with the true Π 0 1 theory of arithmetic. Just as the Π 0 1 fragments of natural theories are often prooftheoretically equivalent to iterated consistency statements over a weak base theory, the Π 0 2 fragments of natural theories are often proof-theoretically equivalent to iterated 1-consistency statements over a weak base theory Conservativity theorems relating 1-consistency and iterated consistency play an important role in the proof-theoretic analysis of arithmetic theories. For instance, it is a consequence of Beklemshev's reduction principle [6] It is not clear whether Theorem 1.1 can be strengthened in the desired manner.
No monotonic function is strictly between the identity and Con
In this section we prove that no monotonic function sends every consistent ϕ to a sentence with deductive strength strictly between ϕ and pϕ^Conpϕqq. Most of the work is contained in the proof of the following lemma. Proof. Let f be as in the statement of the theorem. By assumption the following statement is true.
χ :" @ζpConpζq Ñ pζ & f pζLet ϕ be a true sentence. Then the sentence ψ :" ϕ^χ is true. Let θ :" pψ^pf pψq Ñ Conpψqqq.
Note that θ $ ϕ.
Claim. f pθq $ pθ^f pψqq.
Clearly θ $ ψ. So f pθq $ f pψq since f is monotonic. Also f pθq $ θ by assumption.
Claim. pθ^f pψqq $ pψ^Conpψqq.
Immediate from the definition of θ.
Claim. pψ^Conpψqq $ pθ^Conpθqq.
Clearly pψ^Conpψqq $ θ. It suffices to show that pψ^Conpψqq $ Conpθq.
We reason as follows.
$ Conpθq by the definition of θ.
It is immediate from the preceding claims that f pθq $ pθ^Conpθqq. ❑ A number of results follow immediately from the lemma.
Theorem 2.2. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all consistent ϕ, (i) ϕ^Conpϕq implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq strictly implies ϕ.
Proof. By the lemma, for every true ϕ there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and f pψq $ pψ^Conpψqq. Since we are assuming that pψ^Conpψqq $ f pψq, it follows that rf pψqs " rψ^Conpψqs. ❑
We note that this theorem applies to a number of previously studied operators. For instance, the theorem applies to the notion of cut-free consistency, i.e., consistency with respect to cut-free proofs. EA does not prove the cut-elimination theorem, which is equivalent to the totality of super-exponentiation (over EA), and does not prove the equivalence of cut-free consistency and consistency. Another such operator is the Friedman-Rathjen-Weiermann slow consistency operator discussed in §1. Theorem 2.2 implies that these operators exhibit the same behavior as the consistency operator "in the limit." Indeed, for any ϕ such that ϕ proves the cut-elimination theorem, ϕ^Conpϕq and ϕ^Con CF pϕq are EA-provably equivalent. Likewise, for any ϕ that proves the totality of F ǫ0 , ϕ^Conpϕq and ϕ^SlowConpϕq are EA-provably equivalent.
As a corollary of Theorem 2.2 we note that no monotonic function reliably produces sentences strictly between those produced by the identity and by Con.
Corollary 2.3. There is no monotonic function f such that for all consistent ϕ, (i) ϕ^Conpϕq strictly implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq strictly implies ϕ.
Shavrukov and Visser [13] studied functions over Lindenbaum algberas and discovered a recursive extensional uniform density function g for the Lindenbaum algebra of EA, i.e., (i) for any ϕ and ψ such that ψ strictly implies ϕ, gpxϕ, ψyq is a sentence with deductive strength strictly between ϕ and ψ and (ii) if EA $ pϕ Ø ψq then, for any θ, rgpxϕ, θyqs " rgpxψ, θyqs and rgpxθ, ϕyqs " rgpxθ, ψyqs. They asked whether this result could be strengthened by exhibiting a recursive uniform density function that is monotonic in both its coordinates. As a corollary of our theorem we answer their question negatively.
Corollary 2.4. There is no monotonic uniform density function for the Lindenbaum algebra of EA.
Proof. Suppose there were such a function g over the Lindenbaum algebra of EA. Then given any input of the form xϕ, pϕ^Conpϕqqy, g would produce a sentence with deductive strength strictly between ϕ and pϕ^Conpϕqq. We then note that f : ϕ Þ Ñ gpxϕ, pϕ^Conpϕqqyq is monotonic, but that for every consistent ϕ, ϕ^Conpϕq strictly implies f pϕq and f pϕq strictly implies ϕ, contradicting the previous theorem. sentences over EA that is monotonic in both its coordinates? Remark 2.6. It is clear from the proof of the lemma that any monotonic f meeting the hypotheses of the theorem is not only cofinally equivalent to Con; for every true ϕ that implies
there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and rϕ^Conpϕqs " rψ^Conpψqs " rf pψqs.
This observation points the way toward a corollary of our theorem; namely that any monotonic function strictly meeting the hypotheses of the theorem must have the same range as ϕ Þ Ñ pϕ^Conpϕqq in the limit. To prove this, we first prove a version of jump inversion-Con inversion-for Lindenbaum algebras. This is to say that the range of Con contains a true ideal in the Lindenbaum algebra. A similar result is established for true Π 
Claim. ϕ $ pψ^Conpψqq.
Trivially, ϕ $ ψ. Since ϕ $ ConpJq, it follows that from the formalized second incompleteness theorem, i.e., ConpJq $ Conp ConpJqq, that ϕ $ Conp ConpJqq. But ConpJq is the first disjunct of ψ, so ϕ $ Conpψq.
Claim. pψ^Conpψqq $ ϕ.
Note that Conpψq $ ConpJq. Proof. Let ϕ be a sentence such that ϕ $ ConpJq and
Note that both of these sentences are true, and hence ϕ is in an element of a true ideal. By the previous theorem, there is a ψ such that rψ^Conpψqs " rϕs. By Remark 2.6 there is a θ such that rf pθqs " rψ^Conpψqs " rθ^Conpθqs. ❑
Iterating Con into the transfinite
By analogy with Martin's Conjecture, we would like to show that there is a natural well-ordered hierarchy of monotonic functions and that the successor for this well-ordering is induced by Con. Thus, we define the iterates of Con along elementary presentations of well-orderings. Definition 3.1. By an elementary presentation of a recursive well-ordering we mean a pair pD, ăq of elementary formulas, such that (i) the relation ă well-orders D in the standard model of arithmetic and (ii) EA proves that ă linearly orders the elements satisfying D, and (iii) it is elementarily calculable whether an element represents zero or a successor or a limit.
Definition 3.2.
Given an elementary presentation xα, ăy of a recursive wellordering and a sentence ϕ, we use Gödel's fixed point lemma to define sentences Con ‹ pϕ, βq for β ă α as follows.
We use the notation Con β pϕq for Con ‹ pϕ, βq.
Remark 3.3. Note that, since it is elementarily calculable whether a number represents zero or a successor or a limit, the following clauses are provable in EA.
Note that this hierarchy is proper for true ϕ by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. We need to prove that for transfinite α, Con α is monotonic over the Lindenbaum algebra of EA. Before proving this claim we recall Schmerl's [12] technique of reflexive transfinite induction. Note that "Prpϕq" means that ϕ is provable in EA.
Proposition 3.4. (Schmerl) Suppose that ă is an elementary linear order and that
Proof. Let Apβq denote the claim that Con β pϕq $ Con β pψq. We want to prove that Apαq, without placing any restrictions on α. We prove the equivalent claim that EA $ Apαq. By Proposition 3.4, it suffices to show that EA $ @αpPrp@β ă α, Apβqq Ñ Apαqq.
Reason within EA. Suppose that Prp@β ă α, Apβqq, which is to say that Prp@β ă α, pCon β pϕq $ Con β pψqqq.
Since Con α pϕq contains EA, we infer that
which is just to say that
Since Con α pϕq proves that for all β ă α, EA & Con β pϕq we infer that
EA proves its own Σ is monotonic over the Lindenbaum algebra of EA.
In this section we show that the functions given by iterated consistency are minimal with respect to each other. We fix an elementary presentation α of a recursive well-ordering. We assume that f is a monotonic function such that for every consistent ϕ, f pϕq strictly implies ϕ^Con β pϕq for all β ă α. We would like to relativize the proof of Lemma 2.1 to Con β . However, the proof of Lemma 2.1 relied on the truth of the principle
It is not in general clear that Con α pϕq implies Con α pϕ^ f pϕqq. To solve this problem, we define a sequence of true sentences pθ β q βďα such that for every sentence ϕ, if ϕ $ θ β then Con β pϕq implies Con β pϕ^ f pϕqq. Thus, we are able to relativize the proof of Lemma 2.1 for Con β to sentences that imply θ β .
Definition 3.6. Given an elementary presentation α of a recursive well-ordering, we use effective transfinite recursion to define a sequence of sentences pθ β q βďα .
Remark 3.7. Note that every sentence in the sequence pθ β q βďα has complexity Π 0 3 . Note moreover that for a successor β`1, θ β`1 is equivalent to
(ii) if rf pϕqs ‰ rKs, then f pϕq strictly implies ϕ^Con β pϕq for all β ă α. Then for each β ď α, the sentence θ β is true.
Proof. Let f be as in the statement of the lemma. We prove the claim by induction on β ď α. The base case β " 1 is trivial.
For the successor case we assume that β ă α and that θ β is true; we want to show that θ β`1 is true. So let ζ be a sentence such that ζ $ θ β . We want to show that Con β`1 pζq implies Con β`1 pζ^ f pζqq. We prove the contrapositive, that We reason as follows.
Since ζ $ θ β , ζ $ @γ ă β, True Π3 pθ γ q. From this we infer
ζ^ f pζq $ Con β pζ^ f pζqq by (:).
$ Con
This is to say that Con β`1 pζq.
For the limit case we let β be a limit ordinal and assume that for every γ ă β, θ γ is true. We want to show that θ β is true. Let ζ be a sentence such that for every γ ă β, ζ $ θ γ . We want to show that Con β pζq implies Con β pζ^ f pζqq. So assume that Con β pζq, i.e., for every γ ă β, Con γ pζq. Let γ ă β. Since β is a limit ordinal, γ`1 ă β. So by the inductive hypothesis θ γ`1 is true. That is, by the definition
By instantiation, we infer that
Since ζ $ θ γ and Con γ pζq, this means that Con γ pζ^ f pζqq. Since γ was a generic ordinal less than β, we get that @γ ă β, Con γ pζ^ f pζqq,
i.e., Con β pζq. This completes the proof of the lemma. ❑
Theorem 3.9. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all ϕ, (i) ϕ^Con α pϕq implies f pϕq,
(ii) if rf pϕqs ‰ rKs, then f pϕq strictly implies ϕ^Con β pϕq for all β ă α. Then for every true χ, there is a true ψ such that ψ $ χ and rf pψqs " rψ^Con α pψqs.
Proof. Let χ be a true sentence. By the lemma, θ α is true. So ϕ :" χ^θ α is true. We let ψ :" ϕ^pf pϕq Ñ Con α pϕqq.
Note that ψ $ χ. We now show that rψ^Con α pψqs " rf pψqs.
Claim. f pψq $ pψ^f pϕqq.
Since f is monotonic.
Claim. pψ^f pϕqq $ pϕ^Con α pϕqq.
By the definition of ψ.
Claim. pϕ^Con α pϕqq $ pψ^Con α pψqq.
It is clear from the definition of ψ that pϕ^Con α pϕqq $ ψ. So it suffices to show that pϕ^Con α pϕqq $ Con α pψq.
ϕ^Con α pϕq $ @ζ``@β ă αpζ $ θ β q˘Ñ`Con α pζq Ñ Con α pζ^ f pζqq˘˘by choice of ϕ.
$ @β ă αpϕ $ θ β q Ñ`Con α pϕq Ñ Con α pϕ^ f pϕqq˘by instantiation.
$ @β ă αpϕ $ θ β q Ñ Con α pϕ^ f pϕqq by logic.
Since Con α pϕ^ f pϕqq $ Con α pψq, to prove the desired claim it suffices to show that ϕ^Con α pϕq $ @β ă αpϕ $ θ β q.
ϕ $ θ α by choice of ϕ.
It is immediate from the preceding claims that f pψq $ ψ^Con α pψq. By assumption, ψ`Con α pψq $ f pψq, so it follows that rf pψqs " rψ^Con α pψqs. ❑
Corollary 3.10. There is no monotonic f such that for all ϕ, if rϕ^Con α pϕqs ‰ rKs, then both (i) ϕ^Con
α pϕq strictly implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq strictly implies ϕ^Con β pϕq for all β ă α.
Finite iterates of Con are inevitable
In this section and the next section we prove that the iterates of Con are, in a sense, inevitable. First we show that, for every natural number n, if a monotonic function f is always bounded by Con n , then it is somewhere equivalent to Con k for some k ď n. In §5, we turn to generalizations of this result into the effective transfinite.
Theorem 4.1. Let f be a monotonic function such that for every ϕ, (i) ϕ^Con n pϕq implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq implies ϕ.
Then for some ϕ and some k ď n, rf pϕqs " rϕ^Con k pϕqs ‰ rKs.
Proof. We suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no ψ and no k ď n such that rf pψqs " rψ^Con k pψqs ‰ rKs. We then let ϕ 1 be a true statement such that
The first condition is that ϕ 1 proves that for every consistent ϕ, f pϕq strictly implies ϕ. The second condition is that ϕ 1 proves that f pζq never coincides with ζ^Con k pζq, unless rζ^Con k pζqs " rKs. We define a sequence of statements, starting with ϕ 1 , as follows:
Note that each sentence of the form ϕ k . We will use our assumption to show that, for all k, ϕ k^C on k pϕ k q $ Con k pϕ k`1 q. From this we will deduce that rf pϕ n`1 qs " rϕ n`1^C on n pϕ n`1 qs ‰ rKs, contradicting the assumption that f and Con n never coincide. Most of the work is contained in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.
For all k, for all j ě k, rϕ k^C on k pϕ k qs $ rCon k pϕ j qs.
Proof. We prove the claim by a double induction. The primary induction is on k. For the base case k " 1, we prove the claim by induction on j. The base case j " 1 follows trivially. For the inductive step we assume that rϕ 1^C onpϕ 1 qs $ rConpϕ j qs and show that rϕ 1^C onpϕ 1 qs $ rConpϕ j`1 qs.
ϕ 1^C onpϕ 1 q $ Conpϕ j q by the inductive hypothesis.
$ Conpϕ j^ f pϕ jby logic.
For the inductive step we assume that the claim is true of k´1, i.e., @j ě k´1``ϕ k´1^C on k´1 pϕ k´1 q˘$`Con k´1 pϕ j q˘˘.
We prove the claim for k. Once again, we prove the claim by induction on j.
The base case j " k follows trivially. For the inductive step we assume that ϕ kĈ on k pϕ k q $ Con k pϕ j q. We want to prove that ϕ k^C on k pϕ k q $ Con k pϕ j`1 q.
ϕ k^C on k pϕ k q $ Con k pϕ j q by the inner inductive hypothesis.
$ Pr`pϕ j^C on k´1 pϕ jØ f pϕ j q˘by logic.
Thus, ϕ k^C on k pϕ k q proves that one of the following cases holds.
We now show that ϕ k^C on k pϕ k q refutes the second option.
By the outer inductive hypothesis, EA proves the following conditional:
Thus, f pϕ j q (which contains EA) also proves θ. We now show that f pϕ j q $ Con k´1 pϕ j q.
f pϕ j q $ ϕ j^f pϕ j´1 q since f is monotonic.
$ pϕ j´1^p f pϕ j´1 q Ñ Con j´1 pϕ j´1^f pϕ j´1 q by the definition of ϕ j .
$ ϕ j´1^C on j´1 pϕ j´1 q by logic.
$ ϕ j´1^C on k´1 pϕ j´1 q since j ě k.
$ Con k´1 pϕ j q since f pϕ j q proves θ.
pϕ k^C on k pϕ k$`pϕ j^C on k´1 pϕ j& f pϕ j q˘by the previous claim.
$ Conpϕ j^ f pϕ j q^Con k´1 pϕ j qq.
$ Conpϕ j`1^C on k´1 pϕ jby the definition of ϕ j`1 .
$ Conpϕ j`1^C on k´1 pϕ j`1by the outer inductive hypothesis.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. ❑
As an instance of the lemma, we get that pϕ n^C on n pϕ n$ Con n pϕ n`1 q. We reason as follows.
$ Con n pϕ n q by logic.
$ Con n pϕ n`1 q by the lemma.
On the other hand, ϕ n`1^C on n pϕ n`1 q $ f pϕ n`1 q since f is everywhere bounded by Con n . Thus, rf pϕ n`1 qs " rϕ n`1^C on n pϕ n`1 qs, contradicting the assumption that there is no ψ and no k ď n such that rf pψqs " rψ^Con k pψqs ‰ rKs. ❑
Transfinite iterates of Con are inevitable.
Generalizing the proof of Theorem 4.1 into the transfinite poses the following difficulty. Recall that the proof of Theorem 4.1 makes use of a sequence of sentences starting with ϕ 1 where
It is not clear what the ωth sentence in the sequence should be. A natural idea is that for a limit ordinal λ the corresponding "limit sentence" should quantify over the sentences in the sequence beneath it and express, roughly,
However, if the sentences in the sequence pϕ γ q γăλ have unbounded syntactic complexity, then we are not guaranteed to have a truth-predicate with which we can quantify over them. Nevertheless, we show that Theorem 4.1 generalizes into the transfinite given an additional assumption on complexity. Note that ϕ Þ Ñ pϕ^Conpϕqq can be factored into two functions-the identity and ϕ Þ Ñ Conpϕq-the latter of which always produces a Π 0 1 sentence. For the rest of this section, we will focus on monotonic functions ϕ Þ Ñ ϕ^f pϕq where f is monotonic and also f pϕq P Π Proof. Let f be a monotonic Π 0 1 function such that for every ϕ, pϕ^Con α pϕqq $ pϕ^f pϕqq.
We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is no sentence ζ and no β ď α such that rζ^Con β pζqs " rζ^f pζqs ‰ rKs. We then let ϕ be the conjunction of the following four sentences.
pxqT he first expresses that for every consistent ϕ, f pϕq strictly implies ϕ. The second sentence expresses that if β ă α, then f pζq and ζ^Con β pζq never coincide, unless rζ^Con β pζqs " rKs . The third sentence expresses the monotonicity of f . The fourth sentence expresses the Π 0 2 soundness of EA. Note that each of these sentences is true, so their conjunction ϕ is also true. Each of the four sentences is Π 0 2 , whence so is ϕ. We are interested in the following sequence pϕ β q βďΓ . Note that the sentences in the sequence pϕ β q βďΓ all have complexity Π 0 2 . Note moreover that since ϕ 1 is true, so is ϕ β for every β.
Remark 5.3. We may assume that the ordinal notation system Γ is provably linear in EA. Thus, EA $ @β ď α, @γ ă βpTrue Π2 pϕ β q Ñ True Π2 pϕ γ qq.
Our goal is to show that
contradicting the assumption that f and Con α never coincide. The main lemmas needed to prove this result are the following.
Lemma 5.4 is needed to derive Lemma 5.5. We now show how we use Lemma 5.5 to derive Theorem 5.2. As an instance of Lemma 5.5, letting α " β " γ, we infer that
From the soundness of EA, we infer that
We then reason as follows.
On the other hand, ϕ α`1`C on α pϕ α`1 q $ f pϕ α`1 q since f is everywhere bounded by Con α . Since ϕ 1 is true, so too is ϕ α`1 , whence we infer that
contradicting the claim that there is no sentence ζ and no β ď α such that rζĈ on β pζqs " rζ^f pζqs ‰ rKs. Proof. We reason in EA. Let γ ď α. We assume that (η)
True Π2 pϕ γ q^ True Π1 pf pϕ γ qq.
We we want to derive ϕ α , i.e.
The first conjunct follows trivially from the assumption that True Π2 pϕ γ q. We now prove the second conjunct of ϕ α in two parts, first for all σ such that α ą σ ě γ and then for all σ ă γ. α ą σ ě γ : From the assumption that True Π 0 2 pϕ γ q we infer that ϕ 1 , whence we infer that f is monotonic. Thus, for all δ ě γ, f pϕ δ q $ f pϕ γ q, i.e., EA $ f pϕ δ q Ñ f pϕ γ q˘. From ϕ 1 we also infer that EA is Π 0 2 sound, and so we infer that for all δ ě γ, True Π1 pf pϕ δÑ True Π1 pf pϕ γ qq. From the assumption that True Π1 pf pϕ γwe then infer that for all δ ě γ, True Π1 pf pϕ δ qq, whence for all δ ě γ, True Π1 pf pϕ δÑ Con δ pϕ δ q. σ ă γ : By Remark 5.3, η implies that
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4. ❑
Proof of Lemma 5.5.
In this subsection we prove Lemma 5.5. We recall the statement of Lemma 5.5.
The proof of this lemma is importantly different from the proof of Lemma 4.2. In particular, to push the induction through limit stages we need to know not only that the inductive hypothesis is true but also that it is provable in EA. We resolve this issue by using Schmerl's technique of reflexive transfinite induction (see Proposition 3.4).
In the proof of the lemma, we let Cpγ, δq abbreviate the claim that
Proof. We want to show that EA $ @β ď αp@γ ď βpCpγ, βqqq.
By Proposition 3.4 it suffices to show that
EA $ @αpPrp@β ď α@γ ď βCpγ, βqq Ñ @γ ď αCpγ, αqq.
2 Thus, we reason in EA and fix α. We assume that
We let γ ď α and we want to show that Cpγ, αq.
Since ϕ α $ ϕ we infer that
We first note that both ϕ α $ @δ ă γpTrue Π1 pf pϕ δÑ Con δ pϕ δby the definition of ϕ α and also ϕ α`f pϕ α q $ @δ ă γpf pϕ α q $ f pϕ δsince ϕ 1 proves the monotonicity of f .
$ @δ ă γpEA $ pf pϕ α q Ñ f pϕ δ.
$ @δ ă γpf pϕ α q Ñ True Π1 pf pϕ δsince ϕ 1 proves the Π Combined with (7), this delivers
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.5. ❑ Theorem 5.2 shows the inevitability of the consistency operator. For a sufficiently constrained monotonic function f , f and must coincide with an iterate of Con on some non-trivial sentence. However, it is not clear from the proofs of Theorem 4.1 or Theorem 5.2 that f must coincide with Con on a true sentence. In this section, we investigate the relationship between 1-consistency and iterated consistency. First, we show that 1Con majorizes every iterate of Con α . It is clear that the implication ϕ^1Conpϕq $ ϕ^Con α pϕq is strict as long as rϕ^Con α pϕqs ‰ rKs. This completes the proof of the proposition. ❑
In light of the previous proposition, one might conjecture that 1Con is the weakest monotonic function majorizing every function of the form Con α for some recursive well-ordering α on true sentences. However, this is not so. To demonstrate this, we use a recursive linear order that has no hyperarithmetic infinite descending sequences. Harrison [9] introduced such an ordering with order-type ω CK 1ˆp 1`Qq; see also Feferman and Spector [7] who consider such orderings in the context of iterated reflection principles. We use a variant H of Harrison's ordering such that it is elementarily calculable whether an element of H is zero or a successor or a limit. We note that since H has no hyperarithmetic descending sequences, transfinite induction along H for Π 0 1 properties is valid. Our idea is to produce a function stronger than each Con α but weaker than 1Con by iterating Con along the Harrison linear order. Proof. In Definition 3.2, we used Gödel's fixed point lemma to produce iterates of Con along an elementary well-ordering. We similarly use Gödel's fixed point lemma to define sentences Con ‹ pϕ, βq for β P H as follows.
We use the notation Con β pϕq for Con ‹ pϕ, βq. Recall that we are assuming that it is elementarily calculable whether an element of H is zero or a successor or a limit. Thus, the following clauses are provable in EA.
This follows immediately from Proposition 3.5. Note that in the statement of Lemma 3.4 we assume only that ă is an elementary linear ordering, not a wellordering. , then for any γ P H, pϕ^1Conpϕqq strictly implies pϕ^Con γ pϕqq as long as rpϕ^Con γ pϕqqs ‰ rKs, as in Proposition 6.1. ❑
Claim

An unbounded recursively enumerable set that contains no true ideals
In this section we prove a limitative result. Theorem 2.2 demonstrates that if f is monotonic and that for all consistent ϕ, (i) ϕ^Conpϕq implies f pϕq and (ii) f pϕq strictly implies ϕ, then for cofinally many true ϕ, rf pϕqs " rϕ^Conpϕqs. It is natural to conjecture that cofinal equivalence with Con be strengthened to equivalence to Con in the limit, i.e., on a true ideal. One strategy to strengthen Theorem 2.2 in this way would be to show that every recursively enumerable set that contains arbitrarily strong true sentences and that is closed under provable equivalence contains a true ideal.
We now show that the aforementioned strategy fails. To this end, we define a recursively enumerable set A that contains arbitrarily strong true sentences and that is closed under provable equivalence but does not contain any true ideals. We are grateful to Matthew Harrison-Trainor for simplifying the proof of the following proposition. Proof. Let tϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ...u be an effective Gödel numbering of the language of arithmetic. We describe the construction of A in stages. During a stage n we may activate a sentence ψ, in which case we say that ψ is active until it is deactivated at some later stage n`k. After describing the construction of A we verify that A has the desired properties.
Stage 0: Numerate ϕ 0 and ϕ 0 into A. Activate the sentences pϕ 0^C onpϕ 0and p ϕ 0^C onp ϕ 0 qq.
Stage n+1: There are finitely many active sentences. For each such sentence ψ, numerate θ 0 :" pψ^ϕ n`1 q and θ 1 :" pψ^ ϕ n`1 q into A. Deactivate the sentence ψ and activate the sentences pθ 0^C onpθ 0and pθ 1^C onpθ 1 qq.
We dovetail the construction with a search through EA proofs. If we ever see that EA $ ϕ Ø ψ for some ϕ that we have already numerated into A, then we numerate ψ into A. Now we check that A has the desired properties. It is clear that A is recursively enumerable and that A is closed under EA provable equivalence.
Claim.
A contains arbitrarily strong true sentences. That is, for each true sentence ϕ, there is a true sentence ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and ψ P A.
At any stage in the construction of A, there are finitely many active sentences, ψ 0 , ..., ψ k . An easy induction shows that exactly one of ψ 0 , ..., ψ k is true. Indeed, exactly one of ϕ 0 or ϕ 0 is true, and hence so is exactly one of ϕ 0^C onpϕ 0 q and ϕ 0^C onp ϕ 0 q. And if θ is true, then so is exactly one of ζ 0 :" θ^ϕ k and ζ 1 :" θ^ ϕ k , and hence so too is exactly one of ζ 0^C onpζ 0 q and ζ 1^C onpζ 1 q.
Let ϕ k be a true sentence. At stage k in the construction of A there are only finitely many active sentences ψ 0 , ..., ψ n . We have already seen that exactly one of ψ i is true. But then ϕ k^ψi is true, pϕ k^ψi $ ϕ k q, and pϕ k^ψi q is numerated into A.
Claim. A contains no true ideals.
An easy induction shows that if ψ 0 and ψ 1 are both active at the same stage, then for any θ, if θ implies both ψ 0 and ψ 1 then θ P rKs.
Let ϕ be a true sentence in A. By the previous remark, the only sentences in A that strictly imply ϕ are (i) EA refutable sentences and (ii) sentences that imply ϕ^Conpϕq. Since the Lindenbaum algebra of EA is dense, this means there is some ψ such that pϕ^Conpϕqq strictly implies ψ strictly implies ϕ but ψ R A. ❑
The following questions remain. 
